At the upcoming state visit, the challenge for President Obama is to make sure that the United States works closely with India on the issues of mutual concern.
It is a testament to how far the U.S.-India relationship has come that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be the first foreign leader granted an official state visit to the Obama White House. Amid the pomp and circumstance of the visit next week, both countries’ leaders will speak in lofty terms about the present and future of the U.S.-India strategic partnership. But what does this partnership with India actually mean for U.S. foreign policy?
The answer will depend on the extent to which the Obama administration sees the interests of India and the United States aligning on key administration priorities. While President Obama has expounded on the importance of U.S.-India ties, the administration’s actual prioritization of India remains at best unclear. President Obama’s foreign policy agenda is dominated by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and climate change policy. The latter two issues are also significant priorities for India and are areas ripe for bilateral cooperation. Yet the United States and India have not always seen eye-to-eye and significant differences remain. The challenge for President Obama is to make sure that the United States works closely with India on these critical issues of mutual concern so that this bilateral relationship is in fact a strong and enduring strategic partnership. Without this effort, the strategic partnership will amount to naught.
Afghanistan. India shares the desire of the United States for a stable, secure Afghanistan. Although India has no military involvement in Afghanistan (due to Pakistani sensitivities), India’s current and future reconstruction activities in Afghanistan are critical to successful U.S. efforts. In fact, closer U.S. cooperation with a democratic, U.S.-friendly India—a blossoming regional and rising global power—is vital to stability and the balance of power in the region.
India has already committed more than US$1.3 billion in development assistance for infrastructure and civic projects in Afghanistan. The Indian government also has longstanding ties with Afghanistan pre-dating the Taliban’s rule and enjoys close relations with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, which could assist in rooting out corruption and containing violent Islamic extremism. While Pakistan remains uneasy about India’s intentions in Afghanistan, India has no interest in a destabilized Pakistan and instead seeks to contain Taliban and other terrorist elements and prevent their incursions into Kashmir. By supporting the Karzai government’s efforts to compartmentalize extremist elements in Afghanistan, India’s investment activities in concert with U.S. counterinsurgency efforts could prevent the re-Talibanization of Afghanistan, reversion of Afghanistan into a safe haven for terrorists, and a full-scale spillover of the conflict into Pakistan’s bordering tribal areas and Kashmir. Accordingly, the United States should seek to allay Pakistan’s fears and more publicly support India’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. After all, India sees itself with, in the words of Prime Minister Singh, “vital stakes in the peace, progress, and stability” of the region.
India’s engagement in Afghanistan may also serve to bolster its strategic space in Asia and to counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region. Although not militarily involved, China has been active in Afghanistan since at least 2007, when it signed a US$3.5 billion deal with the Afghan government to mine copper at Aynak, just south of Kabul. China’s activities in Afghanistan appear consistent with its policy to extract resources abroad to supply its growing domestic demand. However, as recently reported by The Economist, the Taliban has sought assistance from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Chinese mutual-security organization that includes Russia and former Soviet states in central Asia, against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. These sorts of reports buttress reservations held by the U.S. and Indian foreign policy establishments regarding China’s intentions in the region. China’s activities in Afghanistan only accentuate India’s need to assert its presence in the country and assist U.S. efforts. The India-China relationship is a strategic rivalry. China is India’s largest trading partner, yet the countries continue to have disputes dating back to their 1962 border war. Moreover, India remains suspicious of China’s support of Pakistan and its economic and military encirclement in neighboring countries and sea lanes pursuant to the so-called “String of Pearls” strategy.
The Obama administration’s China policy appears to overlook India’s important contributions in Afghanistan and leaves open questions on the administration’s views of India’s role in Asia. The U.S.-China joint statement, issued following President Obama’s and Chinese President Hu Jintao’s meetings Tuesday, seems to relegate India’s interest in South Asia subordinate to those of China: “The two sides welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia. They support the efforts of Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight terrorism, maintain domestic stability and achieve sustainable economic and social development, and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.”
With these words, President Obama appears to be acknowledging China’s hegemony in South Asia. President Obama looks as if to be granting China a privileged role in the India-Pakistan relationship—something vehemently opposed by New Delhi and an apparent about-face in U.S. policy. The potential consequences of this joint statement should not be ignored. It signals a possible shift in U.S.-India policy and could ultimately lead to the retreat of the United States from Asia’s security framework.
If this joint statement actually means what it says, this is certainly not the way to roll out the red carpet for Prime Minister Singh. Prime Minister Singh should seek clarification on what this means for U.S.-India relations. Moreover, the Obama administration must carefully consider the detrimental effects such a shift in policy would have for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and on its relationship with India. The architecture of Asia is at a crucial juncture: President Obama should refrain from fundamentally altering U.S. foreign policy so abruptly and, in turn, impairing long-term U.S. strategic interests on the continent.
Climate Change and Energy Policy. The United States and India also have critical roles and mutual interests in the future of global climate change policy as the world’s second- and fourth-largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, respectively. Without commitment by both countries, there is unlikely to be even a basis for discussion at next month’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen or beyond. Despite vastly different levels of development, both countries remain ambivalent about how to address any potential economic and political trade-offs associated with emissions cuts.
A closer look at the state of climate change discussions in the United States and India is revealing:
In the United States, even though President Obama has publicly declared climate change a priority, he has been unable to establish a domestic consensus. The House of Representatives passed a cap-and-trade bill in June, but legislation remains stalled in the Senate. It is highly unlikely at this time that the United States would agree to any multilateral framework that did not address the environmental obligations of developing countries—as this was one of the main U.S. objections to the Kyoto Protocol. The House bill and the pending Kerry-Boxer bill in the Senate notably identify this concern and include border tariff provisions on goods imported from countries, such as India and China, with insufficient climate change policy protections.
Meanwhile, India has already strongly staked out its position. Prime Minister Singh has commented on the need for global climate change policy, but has made clear that developed countries should take responsibility for their previous emissions and that developing countries should not be forced to accept emissions cuts at the expense of their economic growth and development. Moreover, India has been actively building coalitions with other developing countries to assemble a united front vis-à-vis developed countries. Perhaps most strikingly, India recently signed a memorandum of understanding on climate change policy with China.
The U.S. and Indian positions on climate change seem irreconcilable. However, bilateral cooperation on cleaner energy sources could constitute a key incremental step for reframing this issue. As less than 50 percent of India’s rural households have electricity, the country’s thirst for power is certain to grow substantially. Although discussions surrounding the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, signed last year, did not focus solely on the environmental benefits of nuclear power, its contribution to India’s search for non-GHG emitting technologies should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, the agreement still remains unimplemented. The Indian parliament is yet to approve legislation granting civil liability protection to U.S. energy companies; disagreements remain over interpretations of certain U.S. regulations; and a bilateral agreement on the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is still under negotiation. It is rumored that some breakthroughs may be announced during Prime Minister Singh’s visit.
Beyond the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, Prime Minister Singh and President Obama are expected to sign an agreement on clean energy and climate change and may also announce the creation of a joint U.S.-India clean energy research facility. There are also apparently ongoing discussions on joint activities concerning renewable energies such as wind and solar power. These initiatives are to be applauded and should continue to be pursued by the United States and India well into the future. Greater technology sharing, trade missions, and other private sector initiatives hold the promise of assisting India in becoming “greener” outside the climate change policy paradigm.
Despite President Obama’s and Prime Minister’s Singh’s rhetoric on the need for results at Copenhagen, a multilateral agreement on climate change is simply not politically feasible in either country at this time. As a result, the climate change negotiations need not become a U.S.-India conflict on the international stage, similar to the failed Doha Development Agenda trade talks at the World Trade Organization. For the time being, the United States and India should make it a priority to avert any possible rupture in bilateral relations over this issue.
The U.S.-India strategic partnership has the opportunity to be very valuable for U.S. foreign policy if it is viewed as just that—a strategic partnership. The Obama administration needs to consider more carefully that both countries share an important stake in the successful resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan and global efforts on climate change policy. And there is little doubt that the set of issues on which U.S. and Indian foreign policy interests overlap will grow over time, if the relationship evolves positively. President Obama has a prime opportunity to shape the future of the U.S.-India relationship and realize its promise.
Neena Shenai is an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
On Thursday, Shenai moderates an AEI discussion examining U.S.-India relations
Topics: AEI, Afghanistan, American Enterprse Institute, bilateral cooperation, climate change, Governance, government, India, Obama Administration, policy, politics, strategic partnership, U.S., U.S. foreign policy, U.S. India relationship, United States, White House
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